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Traditional Rnowledge
knowledge or Belief
belief (real
• Lore - iraditional
world)
Constitutional, statutory, and ~ommon
common
• Law - Gonstitutior1al,
law ((courthouse)
c0urth0use)
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Ten Things You @ught
Ought to Know About
Teri
~OPAS/J©A
COPAS/JOA out
but Were Nlever
Never Remotely
Interested in Asking
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1
~- Relationship of the Parties unaer
10.
under the JOA
9.

Applicability of Exculpatory Language to
Accounting Activities
~ccownting

8.

Statute of 11.imitations:
Limitations: 24 months or 5 years

7.

Use of COPAS
COF?AS Bulletins or Interpretations;
(AG’s) or Model
now, Advisory Guidelines (AG's)
Form lnter~retations
Interpretations (MFl's)
(MFI’s)
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Protocol
6. lTiming
iming of an Audit and Audit Prot0col
5. Overhead and Dir,ect
Direct Ghar,ges
Charges
Material F?urchases
Purchases
4. Mate~ial
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3. Affiliates

2. Ecological, Eravironme~tal,
Environmental, Safety
1. Mediation, Arbitration, litigation
Litigation
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Relationship of the Parties [p. 1-3]
1956 Form, 1977 Form,
fiorm, and 1982 ~arm
Form
•
•

•
•

Do not s~ecifically
specifically negate ager-1cy
agency
IDo
spe€ifically negate fiduciary
Do not specifically
relationship
relationsm
ip
Do not call the Operator an independent
IDo
contractor
IDo
speGifically obligate the parties to act
Do not specifically
in good faith

These forms do require:
• Good and workmanlike conduct
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Relationship of the Parties [p. 1-3]
1989 JQA
JOA Form
Operator acts as an independent contractor
Not am
an agent, not a fiduciary
Should operate:
(1) In a good and workmanlike manner
due diligence and dispatch
(2) With cue
practice
(3) In accordance with good oilfield J?.ractice
(4) In comRlianGe
compliance with applicable law and
regulation
(5) Parties should deal in good faith
8

Relationship of the Parties [p. 1-3]
But see:
v. Hawkins [p. 2]
see: Texas Oil and Gas v.

Relationship of Trust and Confidence
HELD:
Relationsbip
Non-Operator when
between Operator and Non-ORerator
Operator acquired replacement leases in
Operator’s sole name.
CDperator's
TRIGGER: Execution ot
of a Joint 0Reratirng
Operating
TRIGGlr:R:
Ag ~eement
Agreement
9

Standard of Care [p. 3-6]
•

1982 JOA - "“____
_ _shall
shlall be the Operator of the
conduct and direct
Contract Area,
A ~ea, and shall conauct
and have full control of all
-

Operations on the Contract Area
It shall conduct all such operations in
in
(a) "“....
. . In a good and workmanlike manner
manner....
. . "“
“but it shall have no liability as Operator to the other
(b) "but
parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred,
except such as may result from gross negligence or
misconduct.”
willful misconduct."
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Standard of Care [p. 3-6]
•

1989 JOA
JOA(a) “Operator
"Operator shall conduct its activities under this
agreement as a reasonable prudent operator ...
. . .”"
(b) "“....
. . in
in a good and workmanlike manner"
manner”
(c) "“....
. . with due diligence and dispatch"
dispatch”
(d) "in
“in accordance with ~ood
good oilfield practice"
practice”
. . And in comRliance
compliance with applicable law and
(e) "“....
regulation”
regulation"
(f) "“....
but in no event shall it have any liability as
. .but
Operator to the other parties for losses sustained
or liabilities incurred except such as may result
from gross negligence or willful misconduct."
misconduct.”
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1982 JOA - COPAS
• Exculpator~
Exculpatory Language aoes
does not apply to breaches of
the express provisions of the operating agreement
e.g. COPAS as opposed to improper operations on
the contract area.
- Abraxas
AbFaxas v. Hornburg (2000)
- Gone
Cone v. Fagadau (2002)

Trusts f2003)
(2003)
- Castle Prod. L.P. v. Long Tr:usts
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1982 JOA - COPAS
• Contra
tra
th Cir. 1992)
M arathon Oil
O il Co. (5
(5th
- Stine v. Marathon

This protection [exculpatory language]
• 7fhis
extends to Marathon's
Marathon’s var:ious
various
exte~ds
administrative and accounting duties
including
- The recovery of the costs under the authority
JOA”
of the J®A"
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1989 JOA - COPAS
• Apparently all activities to be judged by
exculpatory language limiting liability to
()perator's
Operator’s gross negligence and willful
misconduct
• Significance:
of contrac
contract stan
standardd re: breach
of
- Not mere breach o
r
ho
GOP~S
COPAS provisions
- Heightened tort standard: Gross Negligence or
Willful Misconduct
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What is Gross Negligence?
• IJepends
Depends on ttle
the definition oi
of the term at
the time the parties entered into the
contract

• Smith
Sm ith v. Elliott
E llio tt & Deats: "laws
“laws which
place of tble
the
subsist at the time and ~lace
making of a contract ...
. . . Ente~
Enter into and
form a part of it, as if they were expressly
incorporated in its terms.”
referred to or in€orporated
terms."
(Tex.Sup. 1878)
1873)
15

What is Gross Negligence??
• Gross ne~ligem
ce means an act 0r
negligence
or omission:
(a) ...
when viewed objectively ...
. . .when
...
Involves an extreme degree of risk,
probability and magnitude
considering the probabilit¥
of the potential ha~
m to others, and
harm

(b) of which the actor has actual,
(o)
subjective awareness ...
. . . But proceeds
with conscious indifference to the rights,
welfa ~e of others ...
safety, or welfare
. . .”"
16

What is Willful Misconduct?
"Willful
“Willful miscor,duct"
misconduct” is irntentional
intentional or
wanton conduct in doing 0r
or omittin§
omitting to
knowledge or
perform acts, with Rnowledge
on the part of tne
the
appreciation of the fact, or:1
culpable person, that daager
danger is likely to
result therefrom.

Steward v. Thomas, 222 Ark. 849, 262
S.W.2d 901 (1953)
17

Observations

(a) Gross negligence and willful misc0nduct
misconduct
not be a standard that applies to
should mot
breaches of the COPAS accounting procedure
tDreaohes
need protectior1
protection from mere
(b) Operators neea
judgment errors but net
not from contract brea0hes
breaches
(c) 2005 Procedure:
Damages and losses [to third Rarties]
parties]
IJamages
to Joint Account
Acc0unt except to the
chargeable t0
Party’s §Jross
gross negligence or
extent caused by a Party's
willful misconduct
18

Recommendation
iThe
he AAPt
AAPL and CORAS
COPAS meed
need to form a joint
committee whose mission woula
would be to a§ree
agree
on a standard of care involving n0t
not only
operational issues but administrative and
accounting issues that will be fair to Operators
and Non-Operators alike. T~e
The current forms
whiGh are a disser1/ice
include lang~age
language which
disservice to the
industry.
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Statuteof LimitationsonCOPAS Breaches[p. 16-19]
Breaches [p. 16-19]
• Did you raise an exception in 24-momth
24-month wi11dow?
window?
• Breach of written contract - 5 years statute of limitations
• Fraud - 3 years statute of limitations
If exception is not timely made, the charges are presumed to
be "conclusively
“conclusively true and correct"
correct”

LESSON:

(1) Need to complain in the 24-month window
(2) Need to file suit within 5 years
20

Prior COPAS Models [p. 24-25]
• Use 0f
of C©PAS
COPAS lnterpretatiorns/Bulletins
Interpretations/Bulletins in
Resolving Audit
At1dit EBxceptions
Exceptions and at trial
- Standard in the industry to use these as guidelines
when taking exception (Lore)
- Rrobably
Probably inadmissible at trial unless the cou[t
court finds
provision of the COPAS is ambiguous
a particular pr.ovision
- "“....
. . Paro
ParolI evidence ca~not
cannot be received of a custom
or wsage
usage which will change the plai~
plain meaning of
tAe
the words or phrase used in the ir1strument"
instrument” Iowa
v. F.S.
/r.S. Ainsa
21

New 2005 C O PAS
• Significant references to Advisory Guidelines
and Model Form Interpretations
• AG-j
AG-199 - Audit Protocol
• AG-24- Obtair;iing
Obtaining approval of accounting
procedure exceptions
• MRl-46-Shore
MFI-46-Shore base facilities and offshore
staging areas
• MPl-27-Employee
MFI-27-Employee oenefits
benefits chargeable to
joint 0perations
operations and subject to percentage
limitations

22

M odification of A ccounting Procedure
[p. 6-8]
•· {The Accounting
cou
dure ca
e modi
1e by
Procedure
can be
modified
coriduct
conduct if not enforcea
enforced
•• Hondo Oil
O il & Gas v. Texas Crude Operator, Inc.

- Operator sent out letter saying it was switching
fr:om
from RASO
PASO to COPAS Accounting Procedures
- Some non-operators complained (Amoco) and
were ~ept
kept under the old agreeme
agreement
□t

23

Modification of Accounting Procedure
• ARCO did not complain, continued to receive
and pay JI
B's uneer
JIB’s
under tffie
the new accounting
procedure

since the proof was tblat
that ARCO
• Court held that sinGe
no m0re
more tAan
than its proportionate
was paying mo
share of costs, the fact that Amoco was pa¥ing
paying
less than its proportionate share did not
the Operator from operating under two
prevent tHe
separate accounting
accounti □ g procedures.
24

R ecom m endation
• If the Operaton
Operator is engaged in charging
inconsistent with the COPAS,
€ OPAS, take exception
even if no litigation is contemplated.
Otherwise, the cnarges
charges will be "presumed
“presumed true
Otnerwise,
and correct"
correct” and an action to secure a firtding
finding
of breach will be lost.

25

Timetable of Audits [p. 12-15]
• 1984 COPAS
OF?
- Need to take exceptions within
witnin 24 month window
(or "charges
“charges shall conclusively be presumed to be
true and correct").
correct”).

exceptions except they
they
- No specific format for audit exceRtions
must oe
be "written"
“written” and there must be a "claim
“claim for
adjustment.”
adjustment."
Operator to reply.
- No timetable for ORerator

26

T im etable of A udits [p. 12-15]
~ 995 COii?
• 1995
COPAS

- Same 24 montb
month window for exceptions
- 180 days for auditors to issue report after
completion of the audit field work
- 180 days for Operator to respond to allow o~
or deny
exceptions

reply to Operator's
Operator’s response
- 90 days for auditor to r.eply
days for Operat0r
Operator to respor1d
respond to reply
- 90 tiays

27

• 2005 COJ?AS
COPAS
- Same 24 month window
- Audit report issued within
withiri 90 days after completion
of the audit testing
the
- A timely filed audit exception precludes trne
Operator from asserting a statute of limitations
defense against such claims
- If the non-operators miss later deadlines, the
Operator's
Operator’s waiver of its rights shall lapse
conducted under AG-19
- Audits are to be Gonducted
in the Petroleum,
Petroleum Industry)
(Expenditure Audits in
28

--1180
(respo □ se must
8 0 days for @perator
Operator to resp0nd
respond (response
be substantive) (if no substantive response,
Operate~
Operator will ewe
owe imterest)
interest)
reply to Operator's
Operator’s response
- 90 days for auditor to rieply
- Operator may call a "resolution
“resolution meeting"
meeting” if audit
resolved after 15 months
issues are not resolvea
non-operator who fails to attend the resolution
- Any n0n-operator
by whatever agreement is
meeting will be bound b~
reached at the meeting
reaGhed
“resolution meetirng"
meeting” does net
not wo~
work,
- If "resolution
k, then the
dispute shall be submitted te
to mediatior,
mediation
29

Overhead [p. 11-12]
• 1984
~ 984 COPAS—as
OR? -as com~ensation
compensation for
administrative, sLJpervision,
supervision, office services ana
and
warehousing costs, Operator shall charge
drilling and producing operations on either:
Perce □ tage Basis.
Fixed Rate Basis or Percentage

30

Overhead
• "Salaries
“Salaries and personal expenses of Technical
Employees and/or the cost of professional
conswltant
consultant services and contract services of
technical personnel directly employed on the
Joi □ t Property: shall be covered by the
Joint
overhead rates or mot"
not” [Election for the panties
parties
overmead
to make]

31

Overhead
• Joint
cl oint Property is defined as: the real ana
and personal
prop,erty
tne agreement to which the
property subject to the
A\ccol:lnting Proceaure
Accounting
Procedure is attached.

on the Crude Petroleum
• Rates can be adjusted based 0n
published by the
and Gas Production Workers Index publisned
Dept. of Eabor
Labor [Now no longer pul>lishect]
published] (If your
old agreement references this index, you need to
change it.)
• Oil and Gas Extraction Index blended with the Crude
Petroleum and Gas Production Workers [New Index]

32

Solution
• J?er
OPA\S,
Per the v0ting
voting provision in 1(6)
I(6) of the ~
COPAS,
the maj0rity
majority can vote to amend the agreement
to adopt tAe
the new intJex
index (unless prohibited l:>y
by
the Operating Agreement)
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Direct Charges
• ~995
OR?
1995 COPAS
- Requires that tecflnical
technical employees be "employed
“employed
on the Joint Property"
Property” to be directly chargeable.
- Also required that benefits, experiditures
expenditures made
pursuant to assessment imposed by governmental
authority, travel, and government mandated
author.ity,
training be paid for plus any establisned
established plan as
COPAS
11~
OPAiS Interpretation No. 1
dealt with in the @

34

Direct Charges
• 2005 COR?AS
COPAS
- rechnical
Technical employees must Be
be performing day-today-to
day operations on the joint property and who report
directly to the
ttie individual performing the first level
supervisor function
- Allows use of allocation system instead of time
chart
- Relies on MFl-37
MFI-37 (Incentive Compensation
Qamages)
Damages)

35

2005 COPAS Other Direct Charges
• Defines "on-site"
“on-site” and "off-site"
“off-site” and provictles
provides
that iield
~ect
field employees on site can be di
direct
charged
• Provides for cflarges
charges for facilities that "serve"
“serve”
the cloint
Joint Property wnder
under certain Gircumstances
circumstances
• Provides for technical employees that are
providing off-site services if such charges are
provitiing
excluded from the overhead rates but only until
tJntil
the specific operating condition or problem is
solved
36

2005 COPAS
• Allows O~erator
late a "day
f0r
Operator to calcUJ
calculate
“day rate"
rate” for
employees representing the Operator's
Operator’s
average salaries and wages of the
tHe employee's
employee’s
specific job category

holidays, vacation pay, etc. plus
• Allows rnolidays,
"reasonable"
“reasonable” relocation expenses, ane
and training
costs as specified in aOF?AS
COPAS MFl-35,
MFI-35, costs of
MFI-27, and Award
benefit plans in COPAS MFl-27,
payments to employees in accordance with
GOPAS
COPAS MFl-49
MFI-49
37

Material Purchases [p. 19-20]
• Compute~
ized Equipment P~icing
Computerized
Pricing System
(CEPS)
• COPAS Historical Price Multiplier [HPM]

Price Quotation from a Vendor that reflects
• l?rice
“current realistic acquisition cost"
cost”
"current
within the
• Amount paid by the Operator witnin
twelve (12) months from the date of
previous twel~e
physical transfer

38

Affiliates [p. 20-21]
• ~984
OR?
1984 COPAS
- Not defined and not mentioned - therefore no
restriction on their
prohibition and no contractual restrietion
use.

• 1995 COPAS
- Defined as an¥.
any party directly 0r
or indirectly
controlled by, o~
or under common contr0I
control
controlling, eontrolled
with the Operator
witra

39

2005 COPAS
• Affiliate defined as "a
“a person, an@ther
another person,
that controls, is c0ntrolled
controlled 0y,
by, or is unde~
under
common control
€antral with the person. Control
means the owneriship
ownership by one persorn
person directly er
or
indirectly of m@re
more thlan
than 50°/o
50% 0f
of the voting
for otHer
other
securities of a corporation or, f0r
~ers0ns,
persons, the equivalent ownership interest
such as partnership interest ana
and "person"
“person”
individual, corporation, partnership,
means an indi"'idual,
trust, estate, unincorporated organization,
association or other legal entity.
40

2005 COPAS
ea?
• How used?
- Amalgamates affiliates for voting procedures
treating them as a Single Party
Affiliate's goods and services
- nor
For use of an Affiliate’s
requiring an AFE, an Affiliate can be used as long
as they are identified, and the goods
go0ds and services
are specifically detailed in the AFE and the total
costs for such goods and services does not exceed
$
_ _(TBD
(TB[) by the parties)
part ies)
$______
41

Affiliates
• Charges to the Joir1t
Joint Account shall not exceed
average commercial rates for such services
• Allows the parties to vote whether the records
relating to the work performed by Affiliates will
not be made available for audit

42

2005 COPAS
• Ear
A\ffiliate's goods and se
~~ices
For use of an Affiliate’s
services
ARE requirea,
where no AFE
required, cnarges
charges for such
goods or services shall require approval of the
Parties if the charges exceed $
_ _in a given
giv
$_____
calendar year.

exceed commercial rates
• Costs must not exceea
prevailing in the area of the Joint
preW'ailing
Joi □ t Property.

43

Ecological, Environmental, Safety
• Costs of off-site tecHnical
technical services cHargeaole
chargeable
if required

technical services covered by
• Costs of off-site teGHnical
not required
overhead if mot

44

• Mediation
• Arbitration
• Litigation ((or
or ~ow
how did you plan to spend the
next five years?)
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WILL STAPLING CREATE HARMONY?
OR
THE ART OF RECONCILING THE JOA AND THE COPAS
I.

The Operating Agreement
Introduction

The framework of operations for oil and gas properties by more than one leasehold owner
is typically a more or less standardized form known as the Joint Operating Agreement. The attempts
at standardization have led to the creation of the A.A.P.L. Form 610 Model Form Operating
Agreement ("JOA"). The most recent form of that agreement is the 1989 version, preceded by the
1956, 1977 and 1982 form. Normally, one of the exhibits attached to the Joint Operating Agreement
is a document called "Accounting Procedure Joint Operations." The current most widely used form
attached to the JOA is the 1984 Onshore Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies' (COP AS)
Accounting Procedure, which outlines the basics of accounting among the co-owners in an oil and
gas venture. There was a new version of the COPAS Accounting Procedure published in 1995
although the 1995 version was not intended by COPAS to replace the 1984 and 1986 forms. In
2005, the newest version of the COPAS accounting procedure was introduced and adapted by
COPAS in April of 2005. The objectives of the 2005 versions were to update the terms, incorporate
standards from COPAS interpretations, provide flexibility for a variety of users and operations,
minimize exception accounting and encourage industry use and acceptance. This paper will analyze
the issues raised by the attempted merger of the form JOA and the form Accounting Procedure, and
litigation issues arising therefrom.
A.

Relationship of Parties under the Operating Agreement.
1.

The Language of the Model Forms

Article V(A) in the 1956 Form, 1977 Form and the 1982 Form states:
"[ABC Oil Company] shall be the operator of the Contract Area and shall conduct
and direct and have full control of all operations on the Contract Area as permitted
and required by, and within the limits of this agreement. It shall conduct all such
operations in a good and workmanlike manner but it shall have no liability as
operator to the other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred, except such
as may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct" (emphasis supplied).
By way of contrast, consider the language· of Article V(A) in the 1989 Model Form which
states:
"[ABC Oil Company] shall be the operator of the Contract Area and shall direct and
have full control of all operations on the Contract Area as permitted and required by,
and within the limits of this agreement. In its performance of services hereunder for
Mid: SRICHARDSON\00I0I0\001803\504678.I

the non-operators, operator shall be an independent contractor not subject to t_he
control or direction of the non-operators except as to the type of operation to be
undertaken in accordance with the election procedures contained in this agreement.
Operator shall not be deemed or hold itself out as the agent of the non-operators with
the authority to bind them to any obligation or liability assumed or incurred by
operator as to any third party. Operator shall conduct its activities under this
agreement as a reasonable prudent operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with
due diligence and dispatch, in accordance with good oilfield practice, and in
compliance with applicable law and regulation, but in no event shall it have any
liability as operator to the other parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred
except such as may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct" (emphasis
supplied).
Article VII of the 1989 Form negates a partnership, joint venture, agency or fiduciary
relationship and states specifically:
"In their relations with each other under this Agreement, the parties shall not be
considered fiduciaries or to have established a confidential relationship but rather
shall be free to act on an arm's length basis in accordance with their own respective
selfinterests, subject however, to the obligations of the parties to act in good faith in
their dealings with each other with respect to its activities hereunder" (emphasis
supplied).
It is significant to note that the forms prior to 1989 did not negate agency, did not specifically
negate a fiduciary relationship, did not call the operator an independent contractor and did not
obligate the parties to act in good faith. Most reported litigation has occurred under the prior forms.
Thus, a case on one of these issues under the 1989 Form could yield a different result. It should be
noted however, that the courts have characteristically looked not only to the agreement, but to the
conduct of the parties and therefore, in some instances where conduct has transgressed the express
terminology, all precedents maybe inapplicable. See Berchelmann v. Western Co., 363 S.W.2d 875
(Tex. Civ. App.--El Paso 1963, writ refd n.r.e.) and Russell v. French & Assocs. Inc., 709 S.W.2d
312 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1986, writ refd n.r.e.).
·
In Arkansas, there is precedent for a non-operator to claim that he and the operator under
Joint Operating Agreement are in a fiduciary relationship. In the case of Texas Oil & Gas
Corporation v. Hawkins Oil & Gas, 668 S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1984), the Supreme Court of
Arkansas considered the case of a Non-Operator who brought an action claiming the Operator owed
him a fiduciary duty. The lower court found the Operator was holding a portion of the leases in trust
for the Non-Operator and the Operator appealed. The Court found a fiduciary relationship, finding
that all the elements of a partnership were present and therefore a joint venture had been undertaken.
The Court found that where the Operator executed a second series of leases contrary to the position
ofhis non-operated partner, it violated his relationship of trust and confidence between the Operator
and Non-Operator which had come about by the execution ofthe original Joint Operating Agreement
(JOA). Id. at 271.
Mid: SRICHARDSON\00I0I0\001803\504678. l
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2.

General Discussion

Any discussion of this area must take note of several excellent articles quoted and which
should be studied. R. BLEDSOE, The Operating Agreement: Matters Not Covered or Inadequately
Covered, 47 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.§ 15.01 (2001); E. SMITH, Duties and Obligations Owed by
an Operator to Non-Operators, Investors and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST.
§§ 12.01, 12.03[5].(Matthew Bender 1986); GLASS, Operating Agreement Issues, 10th ANNUAL
ADVANCED OIL, GAS & MINERAL LAW COURSE 1992; HENDRIX AND GOLDING, The Standard of
Care in the Operation ofOil and Gas Properties, 44 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N § 10-1, 1993.
As shown by these articles, the courts of Texas for the most part have negated a partnership
relationship, a fiduciary relationship and, in most cases, an agency relatiortship as between the
operator and the non-operators, although there have been some other jurisdictions that have found
a fiduciary relationship. Several cases have shed additional light on the duties of the operator. First,
inJohnstonv. American Cometra Inc., 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.--Austin, 1992, writ denied), the
1977 Model Form was at issue. The non-operator argued that the operator was obligated to make
a take-or-pay claim under a Gas Contract and the court discussed the duty of the operator. The court
determined that the duty to perform "in a good and workmanlike manner" as expressed in a 1977
Form meant that the operator was obligated to perform "as a reasonable prudent operator". This
marked the first time that a Texas Court has clearly enunciated this standard. The court further
stated:
"In addition to its duty to act as a reasonably prudent operator, if Cometra acted as
agent of the non-operators in entering into the gas purchase contract with respect to
the sale of gas, Cometra owes to the non-operators all those duties owed by an agent
to its principal." Id. at p. 710.
Thus, not only did the court clarify the duty but it also announced an additional agency duty which,
in effect, means that at least a fiduciary obligation existed. with respect to the handling of the gas
contract. The court quoted Smith in stating "the act of selling for another implies a principal-agent
relationship. An operator who markets gas on behalf of non-operators may have a duty to protect
the rights of such non-operators in the event of disputes with gas purchasers. 11
The liability of the operator as a qualified agent was fortified by the holding in Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 1993, writ denied). Pursuant
to Article VI(C), in what appears to be a 1977 Form, Atlantic Richfield ("ARCO"), who was a
successor ofthe original operator, sold the non-operator's gas to one ofits wholly owned subsidiaries
under a long term interest. The subsidiary made a profit on the transaction when it sold the gas at
a higher price than the price it had paid ARCO. The facts indicated that the subsidiary received
$2.90 per MMBTU for the Plaintiff's gas that had been sold by ARCO to the subsidiary for a price
of$1.60 and $1.40 per MMBTU. The non-operators who had not elected to market their own gas
sued ARCO claiming that it had not obtained "the best price obtainable in the area for such
production" pursuant to the Agreement. The court determined that "best price obtainable" for the
plaintiff's gas should be compared to similarly uncommitted production in the area and not to gas
committed to the long term contract because if the plaintiff had wished to obtain a higher price, it
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had the option of negotiating separately with any gas purchaser. The Operating Agreement did not
require ARCO to sell gas on behalf of the plaintiff. The court was unwilling to rewrite the
agreement to provide that ARCO's option had abruptly become its duty. The plaintiff was held not
to be a third party beneficiary of the contract and the court held there was no duty on ARCO to
renegotiate or to not renegotiate contracts in which the plaintiff has no vested interest. However, the
court turned to the agency argument articulated in the Johnston case, supra, and found that ARCO
was the agent of the plaintiff and had sold gas through its alter ego. The court determined that the
plaintiff was entitled to damages for any profits from the sale of gas by its agent. ARCO argued that
it was not receiving any compensation for selling the plaintiffs gas, but the court held that a
gratuitous agent is subject to the same duty to account as is a paid agent. The agency relationship
is thus clearly created under pre-1989 Forms when an operator sells gas on behalf of a non-operator.
The court did recognize the right of the subsidiary to make a reasonable charge for transportation.

In addition to the agency holding, it is interesting to note that the court apparently ignored
the exculpatory provisions of the Operating Agreement in both -the Long Trusts and the Johnston
cases. It is submitted that this is consistent with the forms for the reasons hereafter stated because
these were both claims based on contract activities under the Operating Agreement and not
"operations" on the "Contract Area."
One other aspect of this case is also noteworthy. ARCO argued that because the plaintiff had
breached the Operating Agreement by failing to pay joint interest billings, it could not then seek to
enforce the agreement. The court held that the first breach was by ARCO and the plaintiff was not
barred from suit by its later breach.
Perhaps the operator under the 1956, 1977 or 1982 forms, while conducting operations on
the Contract Area, should be absolved of the normal negligence standard because the nature of
oilfield operations is potentially dangerous. As to matters which require judgment and which do not
pertain to actual field operations on the Contract Area, e.g., filing for variances with the Texas
Railroad Commission, it is submitted that the reasonable operator standard should apply without
application of the exculpatory clause. This is borne out by a close look at the language of the Model
Form Operating Agreement.
An important principle of contract construction is that the law looks to all provisions of the
contract and seeks to reconcile them. Thus the standard required of the operator performing
activities on the contract area is different--he is not to be liable except in cases of gross negligence
or willful misconduct. Article V(A) of all Pre-1989 Forms should apply only to actual operations
on the Contract Area. The second sentence ofArticle V(A) refers to "such operations" just before
the exculpatory language appears. With respect to other activities expressly addressed in the
agreement (i.e., accounting, billing, record keeping, etc.), which are covered in many other
provisions, neither the good and workmanlike conduct nor the exculpatory provision should apply.
Instead, the ordinary contract/breach analysis should apply. Otherwise the exculpatory provision
severely modifies many other contractual provisions. This analysis is consistent with Johnston and
Long Trusts.
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More recent case law has clarified the application of the standards by which the operator's
conduct is to be measured. The "good and workmanlike," "gross negligence," and "willful
misconduct" concepts found in the exculpatory clause do not apply when the issue is breaches of the
operating agreement as opposed to improper operations on the contract area. In Cone v. Fagadau
Energy Corp., the Eastland Court of Appeals directly addressed whether the exculpatory clause
applies to breach ofcontract claims. 68 S.W.3d 147, 154-55 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied).
In Cone, a non-operator sued the operator for breach of the operating agreement because the operator
directly charged the non-operator for expenses not allowed under the agreement's COP AS provision.
The operator specially excepted asserting that no cause of action had been asserted because the
non-operator did not allege that the operator had failed to charge in a good and workmanlike manner
or was grossly negligent or committed willful misconduct. The Eastland Court reversed holding:
Cones's complaints did not allege the failure of ... [the operator] to operate in a good
and workmanlike manner. Rather, Cone's complaints alleged breaches of the specific
terms of the agreement and are in the nature of an accounting . . . The gross
negligence/willful misconduct requirement applies to any and all claims that the
operator failed to conduct operations in a good and workmanlike manner.

Id. at 155 (citing Abraxas Petro. Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2000, no pet). In Abraxas, the El Paso Court of Appeals concluded, "the exculpatory clause is
limited to claims based upon an allegation that .. . [the operator] failed to act as a reasonably prudent
operator and does not apply to a claim that it breached the JOA." 20 S.W.3d at 759; see also Castle
Prod. L.P. v. Long Trusts, 2003 WL 21771718, * 13 (Tex. App.-Tyler July 31, 2003, pet.
denied)(unpublished); IP Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Wevanco Energy, L.L.C., 116 S.W.3d 888, 894-96
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st] 2003, pet. denied)(exculpatory clause applies to claims resulting from
·
operations).
Contrary to those recent Texas cases, the federal case of Stine v. Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d
254 (5th Cir. 1992), construed the 1982 Form. Stine, the non-operator, claimed that Marathon, the
operator, breached its contract by not turning over operation of two wells to Stine before plugging
and abandoning them, by not furnishing information as required under the Operating Agreement, and
by failing to complete wells in certain oil sands. Additionally, Stine claimed that Marathon
tortiously interfered with Stine's gas contract by collecting proceeds thereunder to pay Stine's
defaults in payments of billings. Thus the court had squarely before it a mix of claims relating to
operations and also to administrative and accounting duties. The Plaintiff successfully argued in the
trial court that the exculpatory language applied only to the physical acts of the operator on the
contract area while Marathon argued that the clause protected the operator from any acts done under
the operating agreement, whether in tort or in breach of contract. The court said:
"... in the present case, Marathon is not liable for any action taken in connection
with the completion, testing or turnover of any well drilled under the provisions of
the JOA unless Stine can prove that Marathon's actions were grossly negligent or
willful. This protection extends to Marathon's various administrative and accounting
duties including the recovery of the costs under the authority of the JOA. It is clear
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to us that the protection in the exculpatory clause extends not only to 'acts unique to
the operator' as a district court expressed it, but also to any acts done under the
authority of the JOA 'as operator'. This protection clearly extends to breaches of the
JOA. It also reaches other acts including acts performed 'as operator' under the
authority of the JOA that amount to tortious interference with contracts with third
parties. We, therefore, hold that the exculpatory clause protects Marathon from
liability for any act taken in its capacity "as operator" under the JOA (except for gross
negligence or willful misconduct)." (emphasis added).
976 F.2d at 260.
In reaching this decision, the Stine court quoted as precedent two 5th Circuit cases from
Louisiana and two Texas cases. Of the two Texas cases, one did not even pertain to an Operating
Agreement and the other was Hamilton v. Texas Oil and Gas Corp., 648 S. W.2d 316 (Tex. App.--El
Paso 1982, writ refd n.r.e.), which pertained to actual operations on the contract area.
The Stine decision, which is a federal decision, is thus inconsistent with Cone, Abraxas, and
IP Petroleum Co., all Texas Courts of Appeals decisions.
There is also a 10th Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion which restricts the exculpatory
language to tort claims and not breach of contract. In Shell Rocky Mountain Production, LLC v.
Ultra Resources, Inc.,415 F.3d 1158 (10 th Cir. 2005), the 10th Circuit Court considered a breachof
contract wherein Ultra alleged that the Operator (Shell), had overcharged working interest owners
for drilling costs that were significantly above prevailing rates in the area, breaching the competitive
rate provision of the JOA. In its defense, Shell argued that the exculpatory clause in Section A of
the JOA released them from liability unless their actions rose to the level of gross negligence or
willful misconduct. Id. at 1169. The Court ruled that the contract breaches at issue were not covered
by the exculpatory clause and that the exculpatory clause only applied to tortious actions, saying that
the unit operator was to conduct all operations in "a good and workmanlike manner." Id.

B.

Different Operating Agreements--Same Contract Area.

Consider the situation where the operator has secured execution of separate Operating
Agreements with different parties on the same land, each Operating Agreement showing the interest
0f only one non-operator and crediting the remaining interest actually owned by others to the
operator. The 1956, 1977 and 1982 Model Forms provide that the Agreement is binding upon the
parties and their respective heirs, devisees, legal representatives, successors and assigns and may be
signed in counterparts. The 1989 Model Form in Article XV(B) and (C) contains a similar provision
and adds that the terms of the Agreement should be deemed to run with the leases or interests
included within the Contract Area. Article XV(A) in the 1989 Model Form provides that a signing
non-operator is bound notwithstanding that other proposed non-operators have not signed the same
agreement.
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Thus, it is clear that none of the Model Form Operating Agreements are designed for this fact
situation, but it is often the case that there are different Operating Agreements between different
parties covering the same contract area, and in some cases the Operating Agreements have been
changed in various ·substantive provisions.
Two cases deal with this indirectly. Osborne v. Rogers, 363 P .2d 219 (Okla. 1961) featured
two separate agreements with the same operator, but with different non-operators and different
provisions. The court quoted paragraph 8 of both Operating Agreements which state:
"The rights and obligations of the parties hereunder shall be individual and several
and not joint nor collective. Each party shall be responsible for his obligations only,
and it is understood and agreed that this Agreement does not create a partnership or
group association between the parties hereto".
The operator sued a non-operator for costs and the non-operator denied liability on the grounds that
the provisions of the Operating Agreement relating to overhead that he had signed had been deleted
by another non-operator and that these deletions constituted a modification of the defendant's
contract as well. The court held the defendant to the contract he had signed without regard to the
modification insisted upon by another non-operator.
Also, in Hondo Oil & Gas Co. v. Texas Crude Operator Inc., the court had little difficulty
enforcing different accounting procedures for different non-operators. The court said:
ARCO further asserts that an operator cannot charge different overhead rates to nonoperators who sign the same Operating Agreement. ARCO therefore believes it must
.be charged the same rate as Amoco. ARCO's argument is based upon contractual
provisions stating parties will be charged their proportionate share of the costs and
expenses.
Although the non-operators signed the same Operating Agreements, they have no
special relationships between them establishing any fiduciary duty. Testimony at trial
established that it was not uncommon to charge different rates to different nonoperators on the same well and that variations and rates are the product of
negotiations. ARCO might have a legitimate claim of breach of contract if Texas
Crude charged at a rate higher than its proportionate share, but no evidence was
presented to support such a claim. Evidence only established that Amoco was
charged a rate at less than its proportionate share. Essentially, Texas Crude decided
it would take the loss from Amoco rather than fight with Amoco. Texas Crude's
decision to take a loss on Amoco does not require it to take a similar loss on ARCO's
overhead payments. Amoco and ARCO are different parties and Texas Crude may
consider different factors in determining whether to take a loss on either party."
970 F.2d 1433 (5th Cir. 1992). In essence, therefore, it appears that each contract will apply to that
party only.
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Given the decision in Hondo, supra, in order to counteract the above, some parties might
contend one agreement between all parties exists because, after a period of time, all were made
aware of the provisions of all the agreements which happened to be the same.
Separate Operating Agreements with each non-operator create acute problems when a nonoperator makes a well proposal to which the operator must respond. The operator's interest, as
reflected in that Operating Agreement, includes interests actually vested in numerous other parties.
If the operator elects to join in the well, does he become responsible for the entire interests as shown
in his agreement with the proposing party? If he wishes to decline, does he necessarily go nonconsent for all parties when one of the other non-operators might wish to join in the well? What
non-consent clause applies? What if there are different percentages in the different Operating
Agreements? It is impossible to make any predictions other than that the operator will regret having
prepared his JOA in this manner.
II.

Joint Interest Audits under the Accounting Procedure
Introduction

The COPAS Accounting Procedure was developed to set the guidelines for the charging of
costs by the operator to the non-operators. During the process of accounting for mutual costs and
the billing for such costs, problems are generally resolved by audits by the non-operator of the
operator's books and records.
Audits are frequently conducted according to a set of "rules" which are based either on the
actual terms of the particular Accounting Procedure at issue, or are based on COPAS publications
(formerly bulletins, interpretations, research papers, etc. which have been developed as an aid to the
oil and gas industry). COPAS did not intend that their guidelines supersede or override existing
contracts and these various COPAS publications were not published as standards. Rather, they are
recommended procedures and practices which may explain, interpret or elaborate on specific oil and
gas accounting issues. See COPAS ACCOUNTS, Vol. 17, No. 3, September 1996, p. 4. COPAS has
now republished many ofits former publications as AG's (Advisory Guidelines) and MFI's (Model
Form Interpretations).
Audit conflicts frequently occur because the billing procedures followed by the operator are
"generic" rather than specific. The larger operators frequently adopt a program or protocol for
making charges to the joint account without regard to the particular form of a model or "manuscript"
agreement in effect on a particular property. Or, the operator will charge according to a COPAS
interpretation or bulletin which contains a suggestion for charging certain kinds of costs without the
operator obtaining permission of the non-operators for making charges according to that bulletin or
interpretation. Frequently, both the operator and the non-operator have a perception about how the
agreements are "supposed to work" instead of a clear understanding of their actual contractual rights
and obligations as written. This is what I call the "lore" rather than the "law."
This discussion will ( 1) review the scant body of law interpreting the COPAS Accounting
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Procedure, (2) discuss problems involving joint account issues and audit issues that have been
encountered in litigation involving the construction of parties' actual rights and obligations under the
COPAS Accounting Procedure as written, and (3) discuss issues arising out of the 2005 COPAS
Accounting Procedure recommended by the Council of Petroleum Accountants Societies.
A.

COPAS Accounting Procedure--Limitations.
The 1984 COPAS Accounting Procedure in section I, paragraph 4 provides:
Payment of any such bills shall not prejudice the first of any non-operator to protest
or question the correctness thereof; provided, however, all bills and statements
rendered to non-operators by operator during any calendar year shall conclusively be
presumed to be true and correct after twenty-four (24) months following the end of
any such calendar year, unless within the said twenty-four (24) month period a nonoperator takes written exception thereto and makes claim on operator for adjustment.
No adjustment favorable to operator shall be made unless-it is made within the same
prescribed period ....

In Anderson v. Vinson Exploration Inc., 832 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1992, writ
denied), the operator sued non-operator for non-payment of certain bills and the non-operator was
not allowed to question the reasonableness or justice of the charges because no written exceptions
were taken within the twenty-four month period.
A similar result was reached in Calpetco 1981 v. Marshall Exploration, inc., 989 F .2d 1408
(5th Cir. 1993). The court said:
"The accounting procedures bound Calpetco to the validity of all of Marshall's
charges unless it had taken written exception thereto and made claim on Marshall for
adjustment within the twenty-four month period".
However, where there has been fraud or fraudulent concealment of material facts the internal
statute oflimitations will be inapplicable. In Exxon Corporation v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources,
Ltd., 775 F. Supp. 969 {LD. Miss. -1991 ), the court analyzed the "conclusive presumption" language
of the accounting procedure and concluded the presumption was rebuttable if there was a showing
of fraud or bad faith breach of contract. The court was uncomfortable with the notion that the
operator could flagrantly overcharge the non-operator and then enforce the payment ifthere had been
no audit.
In a claim by the operator against the non-operator, the courts have applied the four year
statute of limitations because it is a suit on a contract. See Hondo Oil & Gas Co. v. Texas Crude
Operator Inc., 970F.2d 1433 (SthCir.1992). InXCOProductionCompanyv. Jamison,_S.W.3d
_(Tex.App. - Houston (14 th Dist.) 2005 unpublished), the working interest partner
in oil and gas properties sued the other partner alleging breach-of-contract. Upon a finding for
claimant, XCO appealed contending that the contract claim was barred by a statute of limitations
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clause within the accounting procedures section which stated as follows: "All bills and statements
rendered to Non-Operators by Operator during any calendar year shall conclusively be presumed to
be true and correct after 24 months following the end of any such calendar year, unless within the
said 24 month period a Non-Operator takes written exception thereto and makes claim on Operator
for adjustment." Id. at 11. Defendant argued this provision established a two-year statute of
limitations for the Non-Operator to contest any costs deducted by the Operator during a given year.
The Court of Appeals overruled this argument, holding that since both Jameson and XCO were both
non-operating interest holders, the 24-month limitation did not apply. Id.
In Stephenson v. Oneok Resources Company, 99 P .3d 717 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004'ert.
· denied), the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma considered an appeal wherein Non-Operators
sought a declaratory judgment against an Operator, namely that the Operator was not entitled to raise
overhead charges retroactively under a Joint Operating Agreement. The JOA in question had an
attached COPAS Accounting Procedure thatallowed an Operator to change the overhead rate as
provided: "Below rates shall be adjusted as of the first day of April each year following the effective
date of the Agreement to which this Accounting Procedure is attached."
Id. at 719. The JOA
allowed a higher overhead rate during drilling and provided for a lower one when the well was
producing. The Accounting Procedure portion of the JOA contained a stipulation that all bills and
statements by Operator would be presumed to be correct after 24 months if the Non-Operators had
not taken written exception. After three years as Operator, Oneok conducted an internal audit and
discovered that the necessary overhead had not been escalated in prior years. Operator then
retroactively adjusted the overhead rate back two years. Non-Operators refused to pay this
recalculated rate, partially triggering the action.
On appeal, the Operator argued that the language of the JOA stated that well rates "shall" be
adjusted each year stemming from t~e initial overhead rate. The Non-Operators argued that while
the language allowed for an annual adjustment on the first day of April, it did not require it. Further,
they argued the adjustment could only be made to the rate currently in use, not necessarily the initial
overhead rate. Finally, they asserted the JOA barred any adjustment more than two years after the
billing was presented and paid by Non-Operators. Cross-motions for summary judgment on
interpretation of the COPAS consistent with each party's position were filed but the court denied
both summary judgments and submitted the issues to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of
the non-operator's position and against the operator. The trial court judgment provided that the
operator could only charge overhead rates on the rates in use when the operator acquired its interest
in 1997 and any escalations thereafter. The Court of Appeals found that the Accounting Procedures
were reasonably susceptible to different interpretations and that the trial court did not err in
submitting this as a jury question. Id. at 722.

B.

Fixed Rate v. Actual Costs.

The 1984 COPAS Accounting Procedure contained elaborate descriptions of direct charges
in Section II which could be charged to the joint account. Section III of the procedure dealt with
producing and drilling overhead charges which could be on a fixed rate basis or a percentage basis.
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The 1995 COPAS Accounting Procedure provides a new option which is a "mega fixed rate"
per active well which is intended to cover all costs applicable to joint operations except for royalties,
production/severance taxes, ad valorem taxes, controllable materials, downhole well work and
drilling wells and projects. In lieu of that mega fixed rate the parties can elect more traditional
direct charges as set out in Sections III, IV and V of the procedure which cover costs incurred on the
joint property, costs incurred off the joint property, and overhead, respectively. The "mega fixed
rate" is one to be negotiated by the parties and then charged on a monthly basis based on the number
of active completions on the joint property. Those exceptions to the fixed rate generally are the types
of charges which are not as routine and predictable. The non-routine operations which are excluded
· from the megafixed rate are chargeable as costs, and depending on the location of the activity, will
either be covered by direct charges, allocations, or overhead. The 1995 COPAS is locationdeterminative, i.e., if the cost is incurred on the joint property, it is a direct charge to the joint
account; if the charge is incurred off the property, it may be allocated or covered by the overhead
rates depending in part on the agreement negotiated by the parties. Section III of the 1995 COPAS
Accounting Procedure covers costs incurred on the joint property which is defined as the "real and
personal property subject to the agreement to which this accounting procedure is attached." Section
IV covers costs incurred off the joint property which are incurred for "joint operations." "Joint
operations" is defined as "activities required to handle specific operating conditions and problems
for the exploration, development, production, protection, maintenance, abandonment, and restoration
of the joint.property." Thus, under Section III, direct charges can be made for employees, material
and personnel engaged in activities which have occurred on the joint property. In Section IV, costs
incurred at locations that fit the definition of joint operations even if they do not occur on the
property can fall into the category of facilities, ecological/environmental, legal expense, training, or
. engineering, design and drafting which can nevertheless be charged to the joint account. Thus, for
example, engineering time performed for the joint operations but not on the joint property can
nevertheless pe charged to the joint account under these provisions. Other types of charges, i.e., not
direct or allocated, can then be subsumed under overhead which is a more traditional approach
under prior COPAS accounting procedures .

.Qilla:y: If the operator is paid one mega fixed rate (not including the exceptions), what auditable
conduct will there be? If the operator collects such an amount, what provision of the Accounting
Procedure requires expenditures of sums that would otherwise be described and accounted for in the
specific Accounting Procedure Sections III through V? Moreover, how could parties ever
reasonably come to a figure which would approximate the direct cost of all the things described in
those sections? If the mega fixed rate is used, the only auditable conduct would probably be whether
the operator was "reasonably prudent." Whether an operator has been reasonably prudent is a
difficult standard to audit since it is a fact issue that may depend on the person or persons making
the assessment. See Johnston v. American Cometra Inc., 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Austin,
1992, writdenied);Normanv. ApacheCorp., 19F.3d 1017(5thCir.1994);c.f. Westbrookv. Watts,
268 S.W. 2d 694, 697-98 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1954, writ refd n.r.e.) (interpreting good and
workmanlike manner, "in the context of a drilling contract, to mean ·as a reasonably prudent person
engaged in drilling oil wells"'); ERNEST E. SMITH, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to
Non-Operators, Investors, and Other1nterest Owners, 32 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1, 12-30
(1986) ("the reasonable prudent operator standard, which governs the lessee's conduct under the
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typical oil and gas lease, is normally assumed to govern the operator's conduct under the operating
agreement also").
One of the areas which is of concern in COPAS circles recently is the fact that the Crude
Petroleum and Gas Production Workers Index is no longer available. In the 1984 COPAS form,
fixed rates are escalated based on the percentage increase or decrease in the average weekly earnings
of Crude Petroleum and Gas Production Workers for the last calendar years compared to the calendar
year preceding as shown by the index of average weekly earnings of Crude Petroleum and Gas
Production Workers as published by the United State Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, or the equivalent. The 1995 COPAS stated that amended rates will be calculated "in
accordance with COPAS recommendations." Since the old index is no longer published by the
Department of Labor, COPAS has concluded that by "blending the Oil and Gas Extraction Index
with the Professional and Technical Serviceslndex, the results approximate the data from the old
Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers Index." COPAS Economic Factors, Accounting
Procedure Wage Index Adjustment. The change was approved by COPAS at its April 23, 2004
Council Meeting. COPAS also points out that Model Form Interpretation 50 suggests that each
company make its own determination as to whether or not it needs to amend its contracts to use it
or any other new Index .

.Qym: If you are using an 1984 Accounting Procedure, will the parties to the JOA agree that the
new "blended" index will be the "equivalent" ofthe former index specifically referenced in that form
of agreement?
In the 2005 COPAS, the parties agree that the adjustments to overhead rules will be
computed by applying the adjustment factor most recently published by COPAS. The adjusted rules
shall be the initial or amended rules agreed to by the parties increased or decreased by the adjustment
factor described in the COPAS for each year from the effective date of such rules, in accordance with
COPAS MFI-47 ("Adjustment of Overhead Rules").
C.

Role of the Audit.
1.

1984 COPAS Accounting Procedure

The COPAS Accounting Procedure gives the non-operator the right to audit the operator's
books and records. Specifically, Section I, paragraph 5.A. provides:
A non-operator, upon notice in writing to operator and all other non-operators, shall
have the right to audit operator's accounts and records relating to the Joint Account
for any calendar year within the twenty-four (24) month period following the end of
such calendar year; provided, however, the making of an audit shall not extend the
time for the taking of written exception to and the adjustments of accounts as
provided for in Paragraph 4 of this Section I. Where there are two or more nonoperators, the non-operators shall make every reasonable effort to conduct a joint
audit in a manner which will result in a minimum of inconvenience to the operator.
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Operator shall bear no portion of the non-operators' audit cost incurred under this
paragraph unless agreed to by the operator. The audits shall not be conducted more
than once each year without prior approval of operator, except upon the resignation
or removal of the operator, and shall be made at the expense of those non-operators
approving such audit.
The COPAS Accounting Procedure also provides for exceptions or adjustment to the joint
interest billing. Section I, paragraph 4 of the COPAS Accounting Procedure provides as follows:
Payment of any such bills shall not prejudice the right of any non-operator to protest
or question the correctness thereof; provided, however, all bills and statements
rendered to non-operators by operator during any calendar year shall concl usi vel y be
presumed to be true and correct after twenty-four (24) months following the end of
any such calendar year, unless within the said twenty-four (24) month period a nonoperator takes written exception thereto and makes claim on operator for adjustment.
No adjustment favorable to operator shall be made unless·it is made within the same
prescribed period. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent adjustments
resulting from a physical inventory of Controllable Material as provided for in
Section V.
2.

1995 COPAS Accounting Procedure

(a)

Accounts and Records

Thel995 procedure provides that the non-operator "shall have the right to audit the operator's
accounts and records relating to the Joint Account for any calendar year within the 24-month period
following the end of such calendar year; however, conducting an audit shall not extend the time for
the taking of written exception to any adjustments of accounts as provided for in Paragraph 4 of this
Section I." Paragraph 5.A. That paragraph goes on to provide in pertinent part: "A timely filed
audit report or any timely submitted response thereto shall suspend the running of any applicable
statute of limitations regarding claims made in the audit report. While any audit claim is being
resolved, the applicable statute oflimitations will be suspended; however, the failure to comply with
the -deadlines provided herein shall cause the statute to commence running again."
(b)

Timing of an Audit and the Operator's Response

Under paragraph 5.A., the audit report is to be issued within 180 days after completion of the
audit field work.
In paragraph 5.B., the operator is required to allow or deny exceptions in writing within 180
days after receipt of such report. The denied exceptions are to be accompanied by substantive
response and, if the operator fails to provide substantive information on denials within the time
frame provided, the operator will pay interest on the exception, if ultimately granted, from the date
of the audit report.
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The 1995 provisions do not make clear what "applicable statute of limitations_" is to be
suspended. Is it the so-called "internal statute of limitations" set out in the 24-month adjustment
period, or the applicable statute of limitations for breach of contract or fraud in that state? Or is it
the two-year statute of limitations applicable to torts because the Joint Operating Agreement to
which the Accounting Procedure attaches provides that the operator shall not be liable except in the
case of gross negligence or willful misconduct?
In addition to those time periods for audit report and operator response, the 1995 COP AS
Accounting Procedure in paragraph 5.C. provides that the lead audit company shall reply to the
operator's response to an audit report within 90 days of receipt and the operator shall reply to the lead
audit company's follow up response within 90 days of receipt. If the lead audit company does not
provide a "substantive response" to the operator within 90 days, that unresolved audit exception will
be disallowed. If the operator does not provide a "substantive response" to the lead auditor's follow
up response within 90 days, that unresolved audit exception will be allowed and credit given to the
joint account. The COPAS authors leave us wondering who will decide that audit exceptions are
"detailed" enough and responses are "substantive" enough to conform to the Accounting Procedure.
Although the 1995 COPAS Accounting Procedure has now built in a process that takes one
year and a half, the procedure now further provides that the lead audit company or operator may call
an audit resolution conference for the purpose of resolving audit issues/exceptions that are
"outstanding at least 18 months after the date of the audit report." Such resolution meeting requires
that the "attendees will make good faith efforts to resolve outstanding issues, and each party will be
required to present substantive information supporting its position. An audit resolution conference
may be held as often as agreed to by the parties. Issues unresolved at one conference can be
discussed as subsequent conferences until each such issue is resolved." Paragraph 5.A.
As a practical matter, it is very questionable whether a meeting between non-operators and
an operator over issues which have been pending more than 18 months will result in resolution of
the historically disputed issues. A mandatory arbitration provision was considered in the drafting
of the 1995 Accounting Procedure, but not adopted. While parties are certainly free to modify the
Accounting Procedure to add such provisions, as a practical matter it is sometimes difficult to
include non-standard provisions in a published Accounting Procedure. Arbitration of disputes
quickly- becoming the norm in stock broker-client contracts and in other areas of frequent disputes
such as the employer-employee relationship. Given the complexity of joint interest accounting and
the likelihood that these kinds of disputes will proliferate rather than subside with the 1995
Accounting Procedure, the inclusion of a provision for arbitration seems a practical, economic and
fair way to resolve issues which are very costly to address in the context of full-blown litigation.
Moreover, the fallacy of the entire audit process is that if the operator and non-operator disagree on
the interpretation of the obligation of the operator under the Accounting Procedure, the operator
ultimately is the sole authority of what it will grant as an exception and what it will refuse. When
larger operators have adopted policies and procedures that affect hundreds if not thousands of
jointly-operated properties, they are often reluctant, if not downright recalcitrant; to grant an
exception, no matter how the language of the Joint Accounting Procedure differs from their "global"
joint venture accounting practices or procedures.

is
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3.

2005 Accounting Procedure

The 2005 COPAS provides that expenditure audit exceptions for the preceding 24 month
period must be made by the end of the calendar year following such 24 months; otherwise the
billings are conclusively presumed to be true and correct for that period.

4.

Audit deadlines
90 days

Activity
Issuance of Audit Report
A. (Conducted in accordance with AG19["Expenditure Audits in the Petroleum Industry;
Protocol and Procedure Guidelines"]
B. The issuance of a timely audit will toll the statute
of limitations.

·180 days

Written response by Operator (Operator owes interest
ifresponse isn't timely.)

90 days

Reply by lead audit company

90 days

Reply by Operator

15 months

If any audit issues are still outstanding, either party
may call a resolution meeting. If you don't attend, any
party to the JOA loses the right to object to the
resolution reached at the meeting.

60 days

If the resolution meeting is unsuccessful, a mediation
can be requested and held 60 days from the date of the
mediation request.

Cases Discussing the Timing and Content of Audit Expenditure Exception

Anderson v. Vinson Exploration, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 657, 665-66 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992,
writ denied), upheld the trial court's refusal to submit an issue on the reasonableness of charges billed
to non-operators because the only evidence at trial was that the charges were reasonable. The court
held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an issue absent evidence of unreasonableness. Id. The
court states that the plaintiffs "were required under the accounting procedure addendum to the joint
operating agreement to take written exception to any bills and statements with which they disagreed
within twenty-four months after statements were rendered. There is no evidence that this was ever
done .... " Id Similarly, in Exxon Corp. v. Stack, LEXIS 10941 *8 (S.D. Ala. 1992), a nonoperator who. failed to pay joint interest billings was prevented from challenging the statements
because he did not except in writing to the charges within the 24-month period. However, as will
be discussed, despite this language, an exception exists which would make the evidence admissible
- if not to rebut the charges, then for another limited purpose.
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While the Fifth Circuit has also held that non-operators are bound by . the operator's
statements unless written exception is taken thereto, this opinion sets forth circumstances under
which written exception need not be taken. Calpetco I 981 v. Marshall Exploration, Inc., 989 F.2d
1408 (5th Cir. 1993). In Calpetco v. Marshall, Marshall was the operator of numerous oil and gas
properties in which various Calpetco partnerships invested. Id. at 1410. The Calpetco partnerships
began investing with Marshall in 1979. Id. In 1982, the general partner of Calpetco expressed
concerns about the investment to the president of Marshall and in 1985, Calpetco began to question
representations made by Marshall. Id. Calpetco began to reviewcharges made from 1981~84 and
request documents from Marshall. Id. Calpetco claimed Marshall overcharged the Calpetco
. partnerships; Marshall claimed that some of the Calpetco partnerships had not paid amounts due to
Marshall. Id. Marshall reviewed some of Calpetco's accounts and some adjustments were made.
Id. However, the parties did not resolve their dispute and in April 1987, Marshall filed suit against
five of the Calpetco partnerships for non-payment of the charges. Id.
Marshall sought a declaration that charges questioned by Calpetco were conclusively
presumed correct; Calpetco counterclaimed urging breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation.
Id. at 1410-11. Marshall moved for partial summary judgment that Calpetco's claims were barred
by either the contractual 24~month adjustment period or the four year limitations period for breach
of contract. Id. at 1411. Calpetco contended that the limitations period was tolled because Marshall
fraudulently concealed its overcharges thus preventing Calpetco from discovering its claims in a
timely manner. Id. Calpetco filed an affidavit of an auditor of oil and gas operations who was an
active member of COPAS, who testified that the 24 month limitation period was never intended as
"an outright bar against protests and objections after the expiration of the 24 month period." Id. at
. n.5. The trial court granted Marshall's summary judgment, concluding that the Accounting
Procedures were "clear and unambiguous" and thatthey governed "the procedures for charges and
credits for the entire project." Id. at 1411. Another of Marshall's partial summary judgment points
was granted _that Calpetco did not timely object to any of the challenged charges which were
"conclusively presumed true and correct." Id. The court excluded all evidence of overcharges at trial
and judgment was entered in favor of Marshall. Id. at 1411-12.
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the Accounting Procedures, including the
24-month adjustment period, governed billings and payments between the parties for all ventures.
Id. at 1413. However, the court noted that the application of the adjustment period would be
foreclosed in cases of fraudulent concealment, waiver, or estoppel. Id. However, ·the court
ultimately held the limitations period was not tolled because Calpetco did not offer sufficient
summary judgment proof of fraudulent concealment. Id. at 1414. Due to an apparent
misunderstanding of a non-movant's burden at the summary judgment stage, Calpetco did not offer
any summary judgment evidence of fraudulent concealment, relying instead on a conclusory affidavit
which stated that Marshall "employed delaying tactics" and "actively misled Calpetco; .. [and]
effectively precluded Calpetco from discovering in a timely manner the invalidity of the charges and
overcharges." Id. at 1413 & n.15. Approximately two weeks later Calpetco filed a motion to
reconsider to which it attached extensive proof the court found 11very-persuasive," but not timely
filed, overruling Calpetco's motion. Id.
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Furthermore, it is a well established principle that records which might otherwise be
considered "conclusive," may be attacked as fraudulent. Id. at 1413-14; Sanitary Farm Dairies v.
Gammel, 195 F.2d 106, 113-14 (8th Cir. 1952).

In Exxon Corp. v. Crosby-Mississippi Resources, Ltd., 775 F. Supp. 969, 975 (S.D. Miss.
1991), ajfd in part and rev'd in part, 40 FJd 1474 (5th Cir. 1995), the District Court held that the
COPAS provision entitled the operator's monthly billing statements to a conclusive presumption of
correctness if written exception to the statements was not made within the specified time period. In
addition, the Court held that the provision did not violate the Mississippi statute which prohibited
contractual limitations periods which altered the statutory limitations period for a cause of action by
holding the provision was a condition precedent which did not violate the statute. Id. at 976.
Furthermore, while noting that a "conclusive presumption" was "[an] artificially compelling force
which requires the trier-of-fact to find such fact as is conclusively presumed .and which renders
evidence to the contrary as inadmissible," the court held a conclusive presumption is nonetheless
refutable upon a showing of fraud or bad faith breach of contract. Id. citing Caddo Oil Co., Inc. v.
O'Brien, No. 86-0988 (W.D. La. 1988), ajfd, 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990) (in which there was no
allegation or proof of fraud; therefore, the documents on their face were conclusive). The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision that the documents were conclusively presumed correct;
that the provision created an evidentiary presumption "albeit a conclusive one" in favor of the joint
interest billings; and that the presumption was not irrebuttable and could be rebutted upon a finding
of fraud or bad faith breach of contract. Exxon Corp. v. Crosby, 40 FJd 1474, 1486 (5th Cir.
1995)(construing Mississippi law).
Finally, the New Mexico Bankruptcy Court has held that the COP AS provision is a binding
contractuaLprovision in which the _parties to the contract agreed that 24 months was a reasonable
time to object to the statements and that a party's failure to object within the time specified waives
his righttoobject thereafter. lnre Antweil, 115 Bankr. 299,304 (Bankr. D. New Mex. 1990).
Obviously, what constitutes taking "specific detailed written exception" as required in
paragraph 4.A. ofthe 1995 Accounting Procedure is unclear because that phrase is not a defined term
in either the Accounting Procedure or the typical joint operating agreements. In Calpetco v.
Marshall, Calpetco contended that the filingufits counterclaims constituted written exception to the
charges. However, the court stated, "Marshall correctly pointed out that those counterclaims could
not, as a matter oflaw, constitute a written claim for adjustment: they do not point to specific charges
or specific invoices." 989 F.2d at 1416. In Exxon v. Crosby-Mississippi, Crosby argued that its
answer, interrogatories and requests for production constituted written exception to the charges. 775
F. Supp. at 978. The court held material issues of fact existed preventing the granting of a summary
judgment as to whether such pleadings constituted written exception to the charges, noting that
"written exception" was not defined in the parties' contract. Id. After a bench trial, the court
concluded the discovery requests did not constitute written exceptions. 40 F.3d at 1476 & n.l.
Crosby did not appeal this holding. Id.; See also Exxon Corp. v. Stack, in which the court held a
party's interrogatories (which did not specify why the charges were unreasonable or to what extent
they were excessive) did not constitute "written exception" to an operator's charges, based upon
expert testimony that an exception must be clear and specific. Exxon Corp. v. Stack, LEXIS 10941
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at *7-8.
The case of Castle Prod L.P. v. Long Trusts, 2003 WL 21771718 (Tex. App.-Tyler July 31,
2003, pet. denied)(unpublished) provides a cautionary tale as to how payments must be proved up
in court. Castle was a successor in interest to Atlantic Richfield's interest in several producing leases.
The Long Trusts was a non-operator which was banking its share of gas. When Castle began sending
out joint interest billings to the Long Trusts, they never paid any of these invoices. Castle was selling
the Long Trusts' share of condensate but accounting to them only sporadically. It was Castle's claim
that it was netting out condensate sales against what the Long Trusts owed on their joint interest
billings. The Long Trusts argued that JIB's were not revenue account instruments and therefore could
not be used for that purpose. The Court of Appeals reviewed the JIB's and concluded that there were
no entries for credit for production. Moreover, the Court agreed with Long Trusts that in order to
prove payment when payments are in dispute, the one seeking to prove payment must do so under
Rule 95 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in pertinent part:
When a defendant shall desire to prove payment, he shall file with his plea an
account stating distinctly the nature of such payment, and the several items thereof;
failing to do so, he shall not be allowed to prove the same, unless it be so plainly and
particularly described in the plea as to give the plaintiff full notice of the character
thereof.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 95.
The trial court excluded Castle's evidence of payment because they failed to comply with
Rule 95 and the Court of Appeals upheld that exclusion.
A couple of Arkansas cases, such as Collins Securities Corporation v. Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, 998 F.2d 551 (8 th Cir. 1993), have supported the general principle that
records which might otherwise be considered "conclusive," particularly under the 24-month
stipulation in the COPAS Accounting Procedure, can be re-examined if circumstances indicate the
records are fraudulent.
In SEECO, Inc. v. Hales , 22 S.W.3d 157 (Ark. 2000), the Arkansas Supreme Court
considered a case where royalty owners sought allegedly unpaid royalties from a gas producer and
their related utility corporation. At trial, the royalty owners offered proof that the monthly royalty
statements sent to them by SEECO were fraudulent. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the party
claiming fraudulent concealment must show as an element justifiable reliance on the false
representation. InSEECO, this proved a low bar to hurdle, as the allegedly fraudulent royalty check
stubs, which were held to be misleading, were · considered enough for the Supreme Court to
determine that the element of justifiable reliance had been met.
D.

Material Purchases, Transfers and Dispositions.
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The provisions of Section VI in the 1995 COPAS Accounting Procedure (involving the
pricing of equipment transferred out of the operator's 100% inventory) purport to allow use of either
(a) the appropriate COPAS historical price multiplier ("HPM"), or (b) prices provided by the COP AS
Computerized Equipment Pricing System ("CEPS") as an alternative to price quotations that will
reflect the current realistic acquisition costs, historical purchase prices, or (c) "as agreed to by the
parties." See VI.2.A.(1-4).
The 1995 Accounting Procedure attempts to remedy abuse by operators charging for
materials by defining material purchased under a "vendor stocking program" as a direct purchase.
This section was drafted to eliminate abuses by an operator moving all materials through a stocking
point and then pricing the material as a transfer to the joint account at a different (almost always
higher) price. The spirit of the 1995 procedure is that if material is purchased for a joint account
project, it should be charged at cost and not artificially routed through an operator's yard to justify
the charging of a higher price. However, what the 1995 procedure "giveth" it has also "taken away,"
in that the non-operator may be lulled into accepting CEPS, or Computerized Equipment Pricing
System, price for transferred material which is based on antiquated price quotations which bear very
little relation to current prices. To the extent CEPS has been modified by COPAS HPM, or the
Historical Price Multiplier, it is intended that such prices more nearly reflect current market value.
However, the non-operator should be diligent in researching the issue since this has been an area
involving considerable malfeasance.
Note also that used material is not automatically fixed at 75% for Condition B or 50% for
Condition C, but is now written to allow charges for used pipe based on the most recent COP AS
recommended percentages instead of providing fixed adjustments as in the past.
The 2005 COPA generally tracks the 1995 material pricing methodology but also allows
pricing based on a price quotation from a vendor that reflects current realistic acquisition cost or is
based on the amount paid by the Operator within the previous twelve (12) months from the date of
physical transfer.
E.

Affiliates.
1.

1984 COPAS Accounting Procedure

The 1984 COPAS Accounting Procedure defines "First Level Supervisors," "Technical
Employees" and "Personal Expenses." It does not specifically define "Affiliate."
2.

1995 COPAS Accounting Procedure

The 1995 COPAS Accounting Procedure does not define "First Line Supervisors,"
"Technical Employees" or "Personal Expenses." However, it does define an affiliate as follows:
"'Affiliate' shall mean, with respect to the operator, any party directly or indirectly controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with the operator." The 1995 Procedure goes on to provide
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in paragraph 6 that charges to the joint account for any services or materials provided by an Affiliate
shall not exceed "average commercial rates for such services or Materials."
There is no requirement in the 1995 COPAS which would require the Affiliate to be
otherwise engaged in the business of offering goods and services of the type provided to the joint
account, that the Affiliate have other customers or third party relationships, or that the Affiliate truly
have the experience and expertise to offer the goods or services which are being billed to the joint
account.
In the 1984 COPAS, direct charges for material are provided for in Section II, paragraph 5,
and for services in Section II, paragraph 7. There is no discussion as to whether such goods or
services may be purchased from an Affiliate.
The 1995 Accounting Procedure provides not only that services or Materials may be provided
by an Affiliate at average commercial rates, but permits the party to check a blank in which the
parties agree that records relating to the work performed by Affiliates will not be available for audit.
The 2005 COPAS requires the Operator to identify the goods and services provided by an
affiliate or allows the parties to elect that the total costs of such affiliate' s goods and services billed
to an individual project do not exceed a dollar amount to be agreed upon by the parties.
More and more frequently there are audit disputes over an operator's utilization of affiliated
companies, either sister or subsidiary companies, which are part of the "family" of companies of the
operator. There is nothing inherently wrong with the use of Affiliates, but there are some problems
which arise in joint venture accounting which could be avoided by more specific drafting of the
document.
Use of related entities for services and materials presents three distinct problems.
First, were the services or materials actually necessary? The operator could increase profits
of the related entity by ordering and using unnecessary materials and services. This is extremely
difficult to detect and verify through the usual audit as it requires considerable engineering and
operational knowledge and expertise. However, the operator is under common law duties and duties
under the JOA to operate in a reasonable and prudent fashion, and ordering excessive or unnecessary
services would violate this duty. Having stated that, query how the duty to be a reasonably prudent
operator is balanced against the typical language in the JOA which limits an operator's liability to
those instances in which the operator commits gross negligence or willful misconduct.
Second, the services and materials provided by the related entity may not be of the same
standard or quality provided by an independent vendor. This is also difficult to detect or verify
during an office audit. A materials audit can verify that the materials on hand inthe yard or installed
on the lease are of the quality invoiced, unless the related entity had deceptively characterized the
materials themselves. We have seen problems involving related entities mislabeling tubular goods
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as being of a higher quality or as having been tested in certain particulars, when such was not the
fact.
Third, under the 1995 COPAS Accounting Procedure, the Affiliate may charge commercial
rates for its goods or services. The non-operators typically rely upon an operator's selfinterest (being
the owner of a working interest in the project) as a means of insuring that the operator will acquire
services and materials at the lowest possible cost. However, if the operator (or the operator's
principal) owns the related entity, the profits realized by the related entity may more than offset the
increased expenses to the operator's working interest share of the joint account.
COPAS seems to be backtracking to some extent from its Interpretation No. 16 which
generally provided that before a related entity's charges could be taken into account as if third party
invoices, related entity must have a substantial customer base. Interpretation No. 16 generally also
provided that the related entity could charge the particular joint account no more than it charged its
other customers. If under the 1995 procedure it is interpreted that the Affiliate need not have a
separate customer base or true "arms length" contracts with others, then the potential for abuse is
high, particularly if the parties have checked the blank disallowing audits of Affiliates.

If audits of the Affiliate are not allowed, then the non-operator may find itself in the position
of one non-operator of which we are aware in an unreported case who discovered the operator named
in the JOA actually had no employees, and no equipment, not even a stapler. Instead, it used related
entities to perform every service and provide all materials for the operation of the property. The
result was the operator's records consisted solely of highly summarized invoices from the related
entity. Auditing the operator's records in such an instance was of no benefit since all the backup and
support for the charges was in the files of the related entities. In such an instance, the only way to
properly audit the operations would be to audit the books and records of the related entity. If related
entities provide services or materials for the joint account, we believe the better procedure is for the
non-operator and operator to agree to the language set out in Section I, paragraph· 6 of the 1995
Accounting Procedure which provides: "Unless otherwise indicated below, Affiliates performing
services or providing materials for joint operations shall provide the operator with written agreement
to make the records relating to the work performed for the joint account available for audit upon
request by a non-operator under this Accounting Procedure."
F.

Operator Standard of Care for Failure to Follow the Accounting Procedure.
The 1989 JOA provides in Article V that the operator's duty to the non-operator is as follows:
Operator shall conduct its activities under this agreement as a reasonable prudent
operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and dispatch, in
accordance with good oilfield practice, and in compliance with applicable law and
regulation, but in no event shall it have any liability as operator to the other parties
for losses sustained or liabilities incurred except such as may result from· gross
negligence or willful misconduct.

Mid: SRICHARDSON\00I0I0\001803\5046 78.1

21

Under the JOA [and presumably, its addendum, the COPAS Accounting Procedure], the
courts have imposed a duty on the operator to act reasonably and prudently. See Johnston v.
American Cometra, Inc., 83 7 S. W.2d 711 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied). At least one court
has found that an operator breaching the terms of the JOA is liable under contract principles.
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Long Trusts, 860 S.W.2d 439. However, the Fifth Circuit in Stine v.
Marathon Oil Co., 976 F.2d 254, 267 (5th CiL 1992), held that any breaches of the various
administrative and accounting duties under the COPAS Accounting Procedure will create liability
for the operator only if the operator's actions were grossly negligent or constituted willful
misconduct. Id. at 260. The "exculpatory clause" at issue in Stine is typical of those found in model
- form JOA's, including that quoted above. Specifically, the Stine JOA provided that the operator
"shall conduct all operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall have no liability as
operator to the other parties except such as may result from gross negligence or willful misconduct."
Id. at 260. Thus, the jury verdicts against the operator in Stine, which were based on simple breach
of contract and negligence, could not stand.
In particular, the "good and workmanlike," "gross negligence," and "willful misconduct"
concepts found in the exculpatory clause do not applywhen the issue is breaches of the operating
agreement as opposed to improper operations on the contract area. In Cone v. Fagadau Energy
Corp., the Eastland Court of Appeals directly addressed whether the exculpatory clause applies to
breach of contract claims. 68 S.W.3d 147, 154-55 (Tex. App.-Eastland2002,pet. denied). In Cone,
a non-operator sued the operator for breach of the operating agreement because the operator directly
charged the non-operator for expenses not allowed under the agreement's COPAS provision. The
operator specially excepted asserting that no cause of action had been asserted because the
. non-operator did not allege that the operator had failed to charge in. a good and workmanlike manner
or was grossly negligent or commi~ed willful misconduct. The Eastland Court reversed holding:
Cones's complaints did not allege the failure of ... [the operator] to operate in a good
and workmanlike manner. Rather, Cone's complaints alleged breaches ofthe specific
terms of the agreement and are in the nature of an accounting . . . The gross
negligence/willful misconduct requirement applies to any and all claims that the
operator failed to conduct operations in a good and workmanlike manner.

Id. at 155 (citing Abraxas Petro. Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-El Paso
2000, no pet). In Abraxas, the El Paso Court of Appeals concluded, "the exculpatory clause is
limited to claims based upon an allegation that ... [the operator] failed to act as a reasonably prudent
operator and does not apply to a claim that it breached the JOA." 20 S.W.3d at 759; see also Castle
Prod. L.P. v. Long Trusts, 2003 WL 21771718, * 13 (Tex. App.-Tyler July 31, 2003, pet.
denied)(unpublished); IP Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Wevanco Energy, L.L.C., 116 S.W.3d 888, 894-96
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st] 2003, pet. denied)(exculpatory clause applies to claims resulting from
operations).
To the extent the exculpatory clause applies, attention should be given to the definition of
gross negligence. "Gross negligence" is a term in the exculpatory clause ofthe JOA and the name
of an action in tort law. In Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp., gross negligence was considered in
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the context of a joint operating agreement. 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, writ refd
n.r.e.). Reviewing the liability of an operator for the damages incurred by non-operators after a
drilling site was relocated, the court of appeals used the same definition of gross negligence that was
voiced in Burke Royalty. Hamilton, 648 S.W.2d at 323. Finding that there was evidence that could
meet this definition, the Hamilton court found that the exculpatory clause was satisfied and affirmed
damages for the plaintiff. Id The court did not provide any explanation, but despite the tort nature
of this standard and its use in assessing punitive damages, the court readily adopted the common law
definition of gross negligence at that time to apply to the term in the joint operating agreement.
The next case found involving a joint operating agreement which discussed the definition or
elements of gross negligence was JP. Petroleum Co. v. Wevanco Energy, L.L. C., 116 S. W.3d 888
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (1st Dist. 2003] 2003, pet. denied). Here again, non-operators seeking
damages from the operator for gross negligence needed to satisfy an exculpatory clause. The case
was decided upon a jury instruction that used a definition of gross negligence adopted from §
41.001(5) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. See Id at 897. The court noted, though,
that it was unclear if this was the proper definition given the timing of the case, but this was only a
timing issue and not a matter of the source of the definition. See Id. Again, the tort standard for
gross negligence was used.
Both Hamilton and IP. Petroleum used the tort definitions for gross negligence to determine
liability under the exculpatory clause of the JO A. However, the definitions used in these cases - and
eyen which definition should have been used in IP. Petroleum - depend on timing. These two cases
support the use of the tort standard in the JOA context; however, it must be determined what
. definition from which point in time should be used.
In 1990, the Supreme Court· considered a phase severance contract that lacked a definition
for the important term 'casing head gas.' Amarillo Oil Co. v. Energy-Agri Products, Inc., 794
S. W.2d 20 (Tex. 1990). The court decided that because there was a statutory definition at the time
of the making of the contract, that definition was to be incorporated. See Id at 22. The court held
that by failing to insert a definition, the parties "evidenced their intent to incorporate the statutory
definition". Id. This conclusion was based upon Smith v. Elliott & Deats, which stated that "laws
which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract ... enter into and form a part of it,
as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated in its terms." 39 Tex. 201,212 (1873).
This premise, that the terms of a contract carry the meaning recognized by the law at the time
of the making of the contract, carries back further than the 1873 case. The idea draws from the
principal evoked by Article I, Section 16 of the State Constitution: "no bill of attainder, ex post facto
law, retroactive law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made." TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 16. It is duly noted, that this clause "is not intended to deny the right of the legislature to vary
the motive enforcing a remedy". DeCordova v. City of Galveston, 4 Tex. 470 (1849) (interpreting
an earlier constitution, but the same language). Since even this early date, the difference between
remedies and obligations has been recognized. In the case of the exculpatory clause, though, the
meaning of gross negligence will determine when imposing liability against the operator occurs.
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Based upon these principals, Amarillo Oil instructs that the meaning of gross negligence in
the exculpatory clause of any particular JOA is the definition of gross negligence as understood by
the law at the time ofits making of the agreement. See 794 S.W.2d at 22. This utilization of the tort
standard is further supported by analogous uses in cases in 1992 and in 2003. See JP. Petroleum,
116 S.W.3d at 897 and Hamilton, 648 S.W.2d at 323.
G.

Applicability of AG's and MFI's.

The 2005 COP AS has several references to MFI' s which should be reviewed in connection
with evaluating the terms of the COPAS accounting procedures.
1.

Re: Unambiguous Agreement

~ : What impact do COPAS Bulletins or Interpretations or Advisory Guidelines or Model Form
Interpretations have on any given Accounting Procedure if the terms of the Accounting Procedure
are unambiguous?
The law is well-settled that"[e]vidence of custom is ... not admissible to contradict the plain
unambiguous covenants and agreements expressed in the contract itself." Dal-Mac Constr. Co. v.
Victor Lissiak, Jr., Inc., 524 S. W.2d 554, 557 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1975, no writ). For example,
in The Frost Nat'! Bank v. L & F Distributors, Ltd., 122 S.W.3d 922, 931 (Tex. App. - Corpus
Christi 2003, pet. filed), the court refused to consider parol evidence of custom and usage to vary the
terms of an unambiguous contract. The court relied, in part, on a merger clause, but noted as
follows:
Even if the parties had not included a merger clause, we would decline to consider
any parol or extrinsic evidence because the contract language disputed in this case
is unambiguous .... Although course of performance, course of dealing and usage
in trade can supplement or qualify the express terms of a contract, they cannot be
invoked to alter and contradict the terms of an unambiguous contract, see Sun Oil Co.
v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726,732 (Tex. 1981). (Internal citation omitted).
The Frost National Bank court earlier observed that "[a]n ambiguity does not arise simply
because the parties offer conflicting interpretations," and that "[i]f a written contract is worded so
that it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning, then it is unambiguous." Id. at 930.
These principles are thoroughly established under Texas law. As another court explained:
Where the instrument is clearly unambiguous, and the intention and meaning of the
parties can be ascertained from the writing itself, parol evidence cannot be received
of a custom or usage which will change the plain meaning of the words or phrase
used in the instrument, or give it a meaning different from their natural import, or to
discover its meaning. The office of the usage is to interpret the otherwise
indeterminate meaning of the words used so as to fix and explain their doubtful
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meaning. Custom is never admissible, or read into a written instrument, to contradict
what is there plainly stated....
Iowa Canning Co. v. FS. Ainsa Co., Inc., 267 S.W. 540, 541-42 (Tex. Civ. App. -El Paso 1924, no
writ) (reversing and rendering a take-nothing judgment for the defendant because the court allowed
the jury to consider evidence of custom and usage). See also Corso v. Carr, 634 S.W.2d 804, 808
(Tex. Civ. App. -Fort Worth 1982, writ refdn.r.e.) ("[T]he introduction of custom and usage in this
case by parol evidence was highly improper and erroneous. Evidence of custom and usage is not
competent to contradict the plain and unambiguous terms of an express contract nor to vary, control,
impair, restrict, or enlarge the explicit language of the agreement.").
2.

Re: Timing of Interpretations vis a vis Agreement

Qya:y: Would Interpretations which predate the 1995 or 2005 COPAS Accounting Procedure be
considered as custom and industry practice when not specifically referred to in the 1995 or 2005
Accounting Procedure?
Qya:y: Would Interpretations issued by COPAS after the 1995 or 2005 COPAS Accounting
Procedure fall within the exclusion noted in another context in Humble Exploration Co. v. Amcap
Petroleum Associates-1977, 658 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ refd n.r.e.)
(dispute concerned whether the Windfall Profit Tax was encompassed by the provision for deduction
of taxes from net pro<:luction proceeds- court held since the Windfall Profit Tax was not enacted
until after the agreement at issue had been executed, it would have no effect on the agreements).
Practitioners should consider whether an Interpretationor Bulletin or AG or MFI issued subsequent
to the execution of a JOA or COPAS Accounting Procedure can have any impact on the agreements.
Id. at 862.
H.

Conclusion

There are more ·questions about the rights and obligations of parties under the JOA and
COPAS Accounting Procedure than there are reliable answers. Such answers as the courts have
historically given us are not particularly satisfactory to those of us who litigate the industry's "model
forms." More attention ought to be given by the industry to mediation/arbitration of accounting
disputes in order to avoid overreaching by operators and/or costly and protracted litigation.
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